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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment in the 21st Century was the subject of the 2015
Texas Tech School of Law Criminal Law Symposium. My panel considered
DNA and the Fourth Amendment—a subject that has generated abundant,
thoughtful scholarship and genuine controversy among jurists, politicians,
academics, and the public at large.1 Any discussion about DNA and search
and seizure law must consider the Supreme Court’s 2013 ruling in Maryland
v. King.2
King addressed whether a state could forcibly obtain and analyze a DNA
sample from someone arrested for a serious felony.3 During the oral
argument in King, Justice Kennedy asked King’s counsel a series of questions
focusing on whether law enforcement officials had a legitimate interest in
knowing whether an arrestee had committed other crimes.4 While counsel
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I want to thank Elizabeth Parker and Josh
Butera for their excellent research and editing assistance.
1. My understanding of this area of the law has been enhanced by the outstanding legal scholarship
of Professors Erin Murphy and David H. Kaye.
2. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
3. See id. at 1966.
4. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41–43, King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (No. 12-207), 2013 WL 1842092.
Justice Kennedy posed the following questions:
[A] person has been arrested for a felony and is in custody, do the police—does the justice
system have an interest in knowing whether that person committed other crimes?
....
My question is whether or not the police, who have John Doe in custody for a felony, have
an interest in knowing, at the outset or within a few weeks’ time, whether or not that person
has committed other crimes?
....
And my—my question is, do they have an interest—a legitimate interest in knowing if that
person has committed other crimes?
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for King did not provide the answers Justice Kennedy sought, Justice
Kennedy eventually answered his own questions in an opinion for a majority
of the Court.5 Police officials do have a legitimate interest in knowing
whether someone arrested for a serious crime has committed other offenses.6
In a 5–4 ruling, King held that when the police have probable cause to arrest
for a serious offense, “taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s
DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking
procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”7
Of course, Justice Kennedy’s inquiries on the state’s interest in knowing
whether someone had committed other crimes were posed in a context in
which the police made a lawful arrest and utilized means that have a
negligible impact on the bodily integrity of the arrestee.8 Justice Kennedy’s
queries, however, prompt related questions about DNA as an investigative
tool and the Fourth Amendment rights of persons for whom the police do not
have evidence to detain or arrest.
For example, does a state have a legitimate interest in knowing whether
citizens have committed unsolved crimes? If negligible means can be
utilized to obtain DNA samples from individuals, does the state have a
legitimate interest in collecting and analyzing those samples to determine
whether a person has committed crimes in the past, or to connect that person
to a crime committed sometime in the future? Professor Arnold Loewy’s
provocative Article for this Symposium offers a proposal along these lines
for the universal collection of DNA samples to use for law enforcement
purposes.9 Finally, what if a state can obtain a DNA sample without a bodily
intrusion and without the knowledge of the person; does the state have a
legitimate interest in collecting, testing, and storing those samples?

Id.
5. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1965–80.
6. Id. at 1977.
7. Id. at 1980.
8. Id. at 1969 (describing a buccal swab to obtain a DNA sample as “a far more gentle process than
a venipuncture to draw blood,” and noting that the “fact tha[t] an intrusion is negligible is of central
relevance to determining reasonableness, although it is still a search as the law defines that term”).
9. Arnold H. Loewy, A Proposal for the Universal Collection of DNA, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 261
(2015). Others have called for similar types of universal DNA collection from the population. See D.H.
Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for
Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 413; Eric Posner, The Mother of DNA Databases,
SLATE (Mar. 5, 2013, 12:04 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/
2013/03/dna_at_the_supreme_court_the_case_for_ a_universal_database.html.
With a minimal privacy intrusion, [DNA testing] can provide accurate evidence that leads to
convictions. If we really care about rights, we should mandate DNA testing, and not only of
arrestees, but of everyone. A universal DNA database would greatly increase the number of
convictions—vindicating the rights of rape victims and protecting others from serial rapists. . . .
Such a database would greatly reduce the incidence of false convictions, thus protecting the
rights of innocent people who are wrongly accused.
Posner, supra.
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The answer to the third question—whether a state has a legitimate
interest in covertly collecting and analyzing someone’s DNA sample—seems
almost too easy. I believe this is the question judges intuitively asked
themselves when confronted with a Fourth Amendment claim in the so-called
abandoned DNA cases, although these cases have been nominally decided by
asking whether the individual has an expectation of privacy in the furtively
secured DNA sample.10 Of course, the state has a legitimate interest in
collecting and testing DNA surreptitiously obtained from individuals. Cases
are now legendary where police have successfully resolved, sometimes
decades-old, otherwise unsolvable murders and other serious crimes by
covertly and unobtrusively obtaining a DNA sample from someone who the
police did not originally have sufficient cause to arrest or detain.11 The results
in these cases make plain that the state does have a legitimate interest in
securing and analyzing DNA obtained from individuals whom the
Constitution bars the police from detaining. That is why courts have been
nearly unanimous in rejecting Fourth Amendment challenges to the
collection and analysis of DNA samples obtained without force or coercion,
and allowing the admission of that analysis in criminal prosecutions.12
10. For thoughtful analysis of this issue, see Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The
Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2006) and Albert E. Scherr, Genetic
Privacy & the Fourth Amendment: Unregulated Surreptitious DNA Harvesting, 47 GA. L. REV. 445
(2013). Throughout this Article, I use the terms abandoned or shed DNA interchangeably. As Professor
LaFave explains, under property law concepts, when a person is said to have “abandoned” an item, that
use of the term normally means that the person has voluntarily, intentionally, and unconditionally
surrendered his interest in the item. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.6(b), at 878 (5th ed. 2012). That narrow and more protective definition of
abandonment does not apply in the Fourth Amendment context. See id. Under the Fourth Amendment,
courts focus on whether a person, in abandoning or discarding an item, has relinquished his or her
reasonable expectation of privacy in the item. Id. “The fundamental question is whether the
relinquishment occurred under circumstances indicating he retained no justified expectation of privacy in
the object.” Id. Professor Joh defines abandoned DNA as follows: “‘Abandoned DNA’ is any amount of
human tissue capable of DNA analysis and separated from a targeted individual’s person inadvertently or
involuntarily, but not by police coercion.” Joh, supra at 859 (footnote omitted).
11. See Joh, supra note 10, at 860–62 (providing cases).
12. Id. at 868 (“No court has held police collection of abandoned DNA to be illegal. Once DNA is
considered abandoned or knowingly exposed, the Fourth Amendment does not apply at all.”); Scherr,
supra note 10, at 454 (“Courts have uniformly rejected Fourth Amendment protection against surreptitious
harvesting of out-of-body DNA by the police.”); see also LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 877–78 (noting cases
in which courts have held “that one abandons the hair he has cut off by a barber, the saliva he expectorates
onto a public sidewalk[,] leaves on a discarded paper cup, or uses in licking an envelope he then places in
the mail, and the excreta he deposits in a hospital bedpan.” (footnotes omitted)). Although she does not
discuss biological material specifically, Maureen E. Brady’s article, The Lost “Effects” of the Fourth
Amendment: Giving Personal Property Due Protection, 125 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2016), explains that
for many lower courts, the public nature of property seized by the police resolves whether a person enjoys
Fourth Amendment protection for items left in a location accessible to the public: “the location of the
effect is the sole or dominant factor in determining whether an individual has ‘abandoned’ his or her
privacy expectations and thus relinquished any claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”
Regarding the results in these cases, Professor Scherr writes that courts have focused narrowly on
the “putative suspect’s privacy in the discarded item,” and not “explicitly considered either the person’s
privacy rights in the DNA itself or the nature and extent of those genetic-privacy rights.” Scherr, supra
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The existence of a legitimate state interest, however, does not end the
constitutional inquiry when the state seeks to admit DNA evidence in a
criminal prosecution. Although the existence of a legitimate interest that is
rationally enforced suffices when the state is alleged to have impacted
non-fundamental rights, such an interest should not override a Fourth
Amendment right, which is a fundamental and foundational liberty.13 When
utilizing abandoned or shed DNA for criminal investigative purposes, there
are two state actions that arguably trigger Fourth Amendment protection.14
First, the collection of the biological material that contains a person’s DNA
might be considered a search under the Amendment.15 Courts, however, have
rejected this argument.16 To date, judges have concluded that the individual
“abandoned the item upon or in which the DNA-laden cells were found,” and
thus, under Fourth Amendment law, retained “no expectation of privacy in
the item or that which it was in or on.”17

note 10, at 454. According to Scherr, a proper reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry would consider
the property status of the shed DNA, as well as “the information which that DNA may contain,” and the
“individual’s attitude towards that DNA and its contents.” Id. at 464. The judiciary’s focus on the property
status of abandoned DNA is another example of what Professor Orin Kerr has described as a “‘loose’
version of real property law” that controls whether a police intrusion invades a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case
for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809 (2004). “Under these precedents, a ‘reasonable expectation of
privacy’ is not the same as the privacy that a reasonable person would expect. Instead, it acts as a term of
art tied largely to traditional property law concepts.” Id. Although his article does not discuss the shed
DNA cases, Professor Kerr’s thesis accurately describes the results of these cases: “Most existing Fourth
Amendment rules in new technologies are based heavily on property law concepts, and as a result offer
only relatively modest privacy protection in new technologies.” Id. at 838. Thus, it is no surprise that
lower courts have unanimously ruled that the collection of shed DNA samples does not infringe upon a
target’s privacy expectation; the government has a legitimate interest in obtaining biological samples that
have been abandoned by a target. These results reflect “a relatively humble and deferential judicial
attitude.” Id.
13. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 163 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), overruled in
part by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Justice Felix Frankfurter and Professor Yale Kamisar
have nicely described why the Fourth Amendment is a fundamental and foundational freedom. See id.
(“How can there be freedom of thought or freedom of speech or freedom of religion, if the police can,
without warrant, search your house and mine from garret to cellar merely because they are executing a
warrant of arrest?”); Yale Kamisar, The Fourth Amendment and Its Exclusionary Rule, CHAMPION, Sept.–
Oct. 1991, at 2 (“What good is freedom of speech or freedom of religion or any other freedom if law
enforcement officers have unfettered power to violate a person’s privacy and liberty when he sits in his
home or drives his car or walks the streets?”).
14. Cf. State v. Medina, 102 A.3d 661, 667 (Vt. 2014) (noting that, in the course of addressing the
constitutionality of Vermont’s law authorizing the collection of DNA from those arraigned on felony
charges, the initial taking of the DNA sample constitutes a search under the Vermont constitution, “and
the subsequent analysis, storage, and searching of the DNA profile” is a second search “upon personal
security that merit[s] scrutiny” under the state constitution (quoting State v. Martin, 955 A.2d 1144, 1151
(Vt. 2008))).
15. See Scherr, supra note 10, at 487 (explaining that “[i]f ‘entry’ of the physical boundaries of the
body occurs when [the government] enters [the biological sample] to obtain what will become the
alphanumeric identification tag used in forensic DNA analysis, then it is an intrusion”).
16. Id. at 454.
17. Id.
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Second, the analysis of the DNA sample might trigger Fourth
Amendment safeguards. This second issue—whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated when police surreptitiously analyze a citizen’s
involuntarily shed DNA—is the topic of this Article. Specifically, Part II
discusses whether analysis of abandoned DNA constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment.
Part III considers a conflict in the Court’s cases when new technology
or science gives law enforcement authorities enhanced capabilities to
discover information arguably protected by the Fourth Amendment. In some
cases, when deciding whether a search occurred, or the reasonableness of a
challenged search, what a particular intrusion actually reveals matters little;
rather, what matters is the potential risk to privacy posed by new technology.
In other cases, the fact that a particular intrusion has the potential to disclose
highly personal data or massive amounts of information is constitutionally
irrelevant. The only thing that matters is what the intrusion actually revealed.
Finally, Part IV considers the implications of leaving the analysis of shed
DNA unregulated by the Fourth Amendment.
II. DOES ANALYSIS OF SHED OR COVERTLY OBTAINED DNA CONSTITUTE
A SEARCH?
On April 2, 2006, a woman in Bel Air, Maryland, was raped in her
home.18 The attack occurred very early in the morning. The perpetrator
entered the victim’s bedroom, pressed a pillow against her face, and
blindfolded her with his t-shirt. “The victim noticed, however, that her
attacker was Caucasian, had a medium build, and emanated a ‘metallic
scent.’”19 After the perpetrator fled the scene, the victim contacted the police.
Police technicians gathered blood samples found in the bedroom and near the
door where the perpetrator had entered. The victim was taken to a hospital,
“where she underwent a rape examination, during which a nurse took vaginal
and anal swabs,” which disclosed biological material of the rapist.20 These
biological samples were analyzed and enabled law enforcement officials to
develop a DNA profile of the rapist.
Over the next two years, police obtained consensual DNA samples from
nearly twenty persons who might have been involved with the rape. None of
those samples matched the DNA found in the victim’s home and taken during
the rape examination. In July 2008, the victim told police that she suspected
Glenn Raynor was the rapist. Raynor and the victim “had gone to school
together, he was the previous owner of the home in which the rape occurred,
and his body type matched that of the man who raped her.”21 After being
18.
19.
20.
21.

Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 755 (Md. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1509 (2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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contacted by the police, Raynor agreed to meet with them and talk about the
rape. Raynor wore a short-sleeved shirt to the interview, and “repeatedly
rubbed his bare arms against the armrests of his chair, and his body carried a
metallic odor similar to the odor” described by the victim.22 When the police
asked Raynor for a DNA sample, he “responded that he would consent only
if the police agreed to destroy the DNA sample after they concluded their
investigation of the rape.”23 When the police refused, Raynor denied the
request and the interview ended.
After Raynor left the police station, officers took swabs of the armrests
of the chair where Raynor had sat.24 Analysis of those samples showed a
match with the DNA profile taken from the rape scene.25 Police then arrested
Raynor and obtained his DNA sample via a buccal swab. Subsequent
analysis of the DNA from the buccal swab revealed a match to the DNA
profile collected from the victim’s home and from the vaginal and anal swabs
obtained during the rape examination. Raynor was charged with rape,
assault, burglary, and other crimes. At trial, the jury received the DNA
analysis; Raynor was convicted of rape and other crimes, and sentenced to
one hundred years of imprisonment.26
On appeal, an intermediate appellate court ruled that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to the analysis performed on the DNA samples
Raynor left on the chair.27 The court reasoned that the testing of the genetic
material produced a DNA profile that was only used for identification
purposes and that Raynor had “no objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in the identifying characteristics that could be gleaned from the
normal biological residue he left behind.”28
Raynor appealed the ruling to Maryland’s highest court. According to
the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the issue was whether police “testing of
the identifying loci within . . . DNA material for the purpose of determining
whether those loci match that of DNA left at a crime scene constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment.”29 The Court of Appeals held that
analyzing the biological material found on the chair Raynor sat in “is no more
22. Id. at 755–56.
23. Id. at 756.
24. This was an example of “touch” or “contact” DNA harvesting. See Jason Kreag, Going Local:
The Fragmentation of Genetic Surveillance, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1491, 1504 (2015). As Professor Jason
Kreag explains in a recent article, new technologies have enabled the government “the ability to obtain
full forensic DNA profiles from exceedingly small amounts of biological material.” Id. According to
Professor Kreag, analysts can procure DNA profiles from the skin cells shed when touching objects. Id.
“For example, shed skin cells can be collected from the handle of a gun, the portion of a torn screen
touched by an intruder, a brick used to break a window in a burglary, or the steering wheel of a stolen
vehicle.” Id.
25. Raynor, 99 A.3d at 757.
26. Id. at 756.
27. Id. at 757.
28. Id. (quoting Raynor v. State, 29 A.3d 617, 626 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011)).
29. Id.
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a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, than is the testing of
fingerprints, or the observation of any other identifying feature revealed to
the public—visage, apparent age, body type, skin color.”30 The court
dismissed Raynor’s contention that analysis of DNA samples differs from
fingerprints because DNA testing has the potential to provide more
information about a person.31 The possibility that Raynor’s “DNA could
have disclosed more intimate information is of no moment in the present case
because there is no allegation that the police tested his DNA sample for that
purpose.”32
The result in Raynor v. State conflicts with a ruling of the Fourth Circuit,
the federal circuit in which Maryland sits.33 In United States v. Davis, the
Fourth Circuit ruled that the analysis of a suspect’s DNA sample from
clothing, lawfully obtained by the police, was a search.34 The Fourth Circuit
explained that “analysis required to obtain a DNA profile . . . generally
qualifies as a search, because an individual retains a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the information obtained from the testing.”35 Raynor, however,
thought that Davis rested on “a faulty premise,” in light of the logic of King—
“that DNA analysis limited to the 13 junk loci within a person’s DNA
discloses only such information as identifies with near certainty that person
as unique.”36
Raynor’s reliance on King, that chemical analysis of a DNA sample
does not constitute a search, is paradoxical in light of its statement that “[t]he
case at bar implicates those questions left unanswered in King.”37 On the
other hand, it is understandable why Maryland’s highest court cited King in
rejecting Raynor’s claim.38 First, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in King asserts
that the processing of a DNA sample does “not intrude on [an arrestee’s]

30. Id. at 767.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 768.
33. See United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 243–46 (4th Cir. 2012). A conflict between “the
decision of a [federal] court of appeals and that of the highest court of a state where that conflict concerns
a federal question” is an “established reason for the grant of certiorari” by the Supreme Court. STEPHEN
M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 4.9, at 259 (10th ed. 2013).
34. Davis, 690 F.3d at 243–46.
35. Id. at 243–44.
36. Raynor, 99 A.3d at 764.
37. Id. at 759; see also Stephen Mercer & Jessica Gabel, Shadow Dwellers: The Underregulated
World of State and Local DNA Databases, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SUR. AM. L. 639, 658 (2014) (“King did not
directly address the collection, analysis, and retention of DNA samples from persons who have not been
arrested for or convicted of a qualifying offense, leaving open the question of how the Fourth Amendment
applies to crime victim, elimination, and suspect samples that have been volunteered to the police.”).
38. Subsequent to the ruling in Raynor, the highest court of Massachusetts has also relied upon King
to reject the claim that DNA analysis of a bloodstained shirt lawfully seized by the police was a search
under the Fourth Amendment. See Commonwealth v. Arzola, 26 N.E.3d 185, 194 (Mass. 2015) (holding
that when “DNA analysis is limited to the creation of a DNA profile from lawfully seized evidence of a
crime, and where the profile is used only to identify its unknown source, the DNA analysis is not a search
in the constitutional sense”).
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privacy in a way that would make his DNA identification unconstitutional.”39
Justice Kennedy explained that the processing of the DNA in King identified
“noncoding parts of the DNA that do not reveal the genetic traits of the
arrestee.”40 Indeed, Justice Kennedy dismissed the notion that analyzing
biological material to produce a DNA profile reveals any private medical
information.41 Furthermore, even if the testing could reveal private genetic
data, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the police “analyze DNA for the sole
purpose of generating a unique identifying number against which future
samples may be matched.”42 Finally, Justice Kennedy pointed to the
“statutory protections guarding against further invasion of privacy.”43 There,
Justice Kennedy noted that Maryland’s DNA law only permits DNA records
related to the identification of persons to be collected, analyzed, and stored,
and allows testing for identification purposes only.44 In light of these
“scientific and statutory safeguards,” the Court concluded that analysis of an
arrestee’s DNA “did not amount to a significant invasion of privacy that
would render the DNA identification impermissible under the Fourth
Amendment.”45
When carefully examined, the last passage—analysis of a DNA sample
“did not amount to a significant invasion of privacy that would render the
DNA identification impermissible under the Fourth Amendment”—is subject
to two interpretations.46 The passage is vague because Justice Kennedy does
not clearly announce that analysis of a DNA sample is not a search. If a
challenged police intrusion does not amount to a search, the challenger does
not possess an expectation of privacy in the information revealed by the
police action. Under the Court’s precedents for determining whether a search
has occurred, an expectation of privacy is an all-or-nothing proposition.47
Instead of being clear, Justice Kennedy fudges the issue by stating that
analysis of a DNA sample “did not amount to a significant invasion of
privacy.”48 However, Raynor read King to stand for the rule that analysis of
a DNA sample does not constitute a search.49
At the same time, this passage from King can read to stand for the
proposition that analysis of a DNA sample, although a search, does not
amount to an unreasonable search. Under this reading, analysis of a DNA
39. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013).
40. Id.
41. Id. (“The argument that the testing at issue in this case reveals any private medical information
at all is open to dispute.”).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1979–80.
45. Id. at 1980.
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–47 (1979) (holding that a person has no
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers dialed from his home).
48. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (emphasis added).
49. Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 759 (Md. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1509 (2015).
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sample is a reasonable search because it only reveals information related to
an arrestee’s identification.
Ultimately, King does not control the issue resolved in Raynor or Davis.
Indeed, King had no reason to address whether a search occurs when the
police, without statutory authorization or guidelines, collect and analyze shed
DNA samples for investigative purposes. King involved the collection and
analysis of DNA from a group of persons—those lawfully arrested for serious
offenses and held for future prosecution—who possess diminished privacy
interests under the Fourth Amendment.50 By contrast, persons like Raynor
and Davis, not subject to arrest or lawful police detention, enjoy the full
protection of the Fourth Amendment vis-à-vis their interactions with the
police. For members of the public—“free citizens”—the Fourth Amendment
presumes the government will not intrude upon their privacy or possessions,
unless there is probable cause or individualized suspicion to do so, or the
government has a compelling interest or a “special need” to conduct a
suspicionless search or seizure that is unrelated to law enforcement
purposes.51
Moreover, in upholding Maryland’s DNA act, King stressed that the
police exercised no discretion in deciding who was searched.52 “The DNA
collection is not subject to the judgment of officers whose perspective might
be ‘colored by their primary involvement in “the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime.”’”53 The same cannot be said about the activities of
the police in Raynor, Davis, and other abandoned DNA cases, in which the
police obtain and analyze DNA samples without statutory restrictions or
guidelines. “The vast majority of states . . . do not curb or regulate the
categories of DNA samples from known persons that may be stored in the

50. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979) (noting privacy expectations of arrestees
“necessarily would be of a diminished scope”); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1977)
(noting that searches of an arrestee are justified in part by the “reduced expectations of privacy caused by
the arrest”), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); cf. United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 237 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that “an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial
arrest retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person”).
51. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1981 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Although there is a ‘closely guarded
category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches,’ that has never included searches designed
to serve ‘the normal need for law enforcement.’ Even the common name for suspicionless searches—
‘special needs’ searches—itself reflects that they must be justified, always, by concerns ‘other than crime
detection.’” (citations omitted)); see, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (applying
the special needs doctrine to school officials conducting urine testing of high-school athletes to detect
drug use); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (applying the special needs doctrine
to government searches of railroad employees involved in train accidents or safety incidents); Nat’l
Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668–77 (1989) (applying the special needs doctrine to
selected employees of the United States Customs Service subjected to urine tests to detect narcotics use);
see also Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee’s DNA a Valid Special Needs Search Under the Fourth
Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do?, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 102, 108–15 (2005)
(discussing the special needs doctrine and applicability to DNA searches of arrestees).
52. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970 (majority opinion).
53. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968)).
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state or local databases.”54 Put differently, when the police sought Raynor’s
DNA, they acted with unfettered discretion.55 “This kind of standardless and
unconstrained discretion is the evil the Court has discerned when in previous
cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be
circumscribed, at least to some extent.”56
King is distinguishable from the abandoned DNA cases in another way.
When the police obtained King’s DNA sample, he was cognizant of the
search.57 By contrast, when DNA is secretly obtained and tested, the putative
suspect is ignorant of the police intrusion. The covert nature of the police
operation appears to exacerbate the intrusion for someone like Raynor, who
expressly refused to provide his DNA to the police.58
Lastly, King does not control cases like Raynor or Davis because law
enforcement officials did not obtain and analyze Raynor’s or Davis’s DNA
to identify them; police already knew their identity. “The sole purpose of
seizing and searching [their] DNA was to link [Raynor and Davis] to an
unsolved crime.”59 King, on the other hand, rested its holding on the
supposed need to identify those arrested for serious offenses.60 Indeed, the
need to identify arrestees was the critical principle that justified the search in
King.61
54. Mercer & Gabel, supra note 37, at 655.
55. See also Kreag, supra note 24, at 1497 (stating that local DNA databases, operated by local and
state police independent of the federal CODIS, run and supervised by the FBI, “increase distributional
inequities because local police have total discretion about who to target for inclusion in these databases.
This has resulted in police seeking out the ‘usual suspects’—poor people of color—to secure DNA
samples for these databases.”); id. at 1527 (noting that the inclusion in local databases of DNA profiles
“from suspects, not just those arrested or convicted of crimes, gives local law enforcement officials
tremendous discretion in building their local databases”); Mercer & Gabel, supra note 37 (noting that
when police obtain DNA samples from someone not under arrest, the “privacy concerns for these
individuals are amplified, because at each stage in the collection and use of volunteered DNA, a police
officer must exercise his discretion without guidance from a generally applicable statute uniformly applied
to all nonoffenders”); cf. Joh, supra note 10, at 865 (stating that when police collect and analyze abandoned
DNA, “existing Fourth Amendment law appears not to apply at all”).
56. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
57. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1966.
58. Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10–11,
Raynor v. Maryland, 135 S. Ct. 1509 (2015) (No. 14-885), 2015 WL 738571 [hereinafter Brief of Amicus
Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation]. If the Court were to address the issue discussed here, I doubt that
it would place much weight on this point. In many of the seminal privacy cases, for example, Kyllo v.
United States and Katz v. United States, the target was unaware of the police intrusion. See Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–31 (2001); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). Such unawareness
rarely matters when deciding whether a search has occurred. Although the Katz test does consider the
subjective nature of the target’s privacy interest, ultimately what matters is the objective nature of the
privacy interest, i.e., is this an interest society is prepared to accept? See Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One
Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 122 (2015) (arguing that the
subjective prong of the Katz test has been altered; only the objective prong matters).
59. Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 58, at 11.
60. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970–74.
61. See Erin Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and the Divided Court, 127
HARV. L. REV. 161, 177 (2013) (“The most radical aspect of King is its reimagination of the idea of
‘identity’ to include criminal history and other information beyond ‘name and social security
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For the reasons listed above, the result and logic of King do not control
the question of whether police analysis of an involuntarily shed DNA sample
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. More interesting,
although not acknowledged in King, is that the Court itself has already
addressed whether government analysis of lawfully obtained biological
samples constitutes a search.62
In 1989, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n considered
whether toxicological collection and testing of blood, breath, and urine
samples—to detect the presence of alcohol or drugs—of railroad employees
involved in accidents or safety incidents violated the Fourth Amendment.63
In an opinion upholding the procedures, Justice Kennedy held for the Court
that collecting the samples was a search.64 More pertinent to the topic
discussed here, however, was the Court’s conclusion concerning the analysis
of blood, breath, and urine samples. Regarding testing of a blood sample,
Skinner explained that the “ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain
physiological data is a further invasion of the tested employee’s privacy
interests.”65 With respect to testing urine samples, Justice Kennedy
acknowledged that collection and analysis of the samples did not require a
bodily intrusion.66 Nevertheless, and unlike his opinion in King, Justice
Kennedy spoke plainly in Skinner when he stated that analysis of the samples
constituted a search: “It is not disputed, however, that chemical analysis of
urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about an
employee, including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.”67
To leave no doubt about his conclusion on this matter, Justice Kennedy
closed this section of Skinner with the following statement: “Because it is
clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of
privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, . . . these intrusions
must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment.”68
Skinner’s conclusion that analysis of biological samples constitutes a
search has been affirmed by the Court.69 Most recently, in Ferguson v.
Charleston, the Court explained, relying on Skinner, that urine tests
conducted by state actors to determine whether pregnant women had used
illegal drugs during their pregnancies “were indisputably searches within the

number . . . .’”); Tracey Maclin, Maryland v King: Terry v Ohio Redux, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 359, 397
(2014) (“Because the Court’s precedents offered no support for Kennedy’s position, he had to create an
expansive and novel definition of ‘identity’ in order to uphold DNA searches of arrestees.”).
62. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624–33 (1989).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 616–18.
65. Id. at 616 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 617.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
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meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”70 In a footnote, Ferguson explained
that the constitutional status of such tests did not turn on whether test results
were reported to law enforcement officials.71 The soundness of this
constitutional rule had not been questioned prior to King.
If government analysis of urine samples taken from heavily regulated
workers like railroad employees, who have diminished privacy interests “by
reason of their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to
ensure safety,”72 amounts to a search under the Fourth Amendment, it is not
so obvious why similar analysis by police officials of biological residue left
by a free citizen on a discarded straw, a cigarette butt, or an armrest in a
police station is not equally a search. As Professor D.H. Kaye wrote in 2001,
“all the forms of DNA sampling” should be deemed searches because DNA
sampling is close to urinalysis in that subsequent biochemical testing can
reveal “private medical facts.”73
Perhaps, when Justice Kennedy wrote in King that analysis of an
arrestee’s DNA sample “did not amount to a significant invasion of privacy
that would render the DNA identification impermissible under the Fourth
Amendment,” he was simply finding that such analysis was not a search
under the Fourth Amendment in light of the diminished privacy interests of
arrestees held for future prosecution and the state’s legitimate interest in
knowing the arrestee’s criminal history.74 If that is what Justice Kennedy
meant, then King does not support concluding that analysis of an abandoned
DNA sample collected from a free citizen is also not a search. A contrary
conclusion—the conclusion reached in Raynor—conflicts with what Justice
Kennedy said twenty-four years earlier in Skinner when he ruled that analysis
of biological samples “must be deemed Fourth Amendment searches.”75
III. TENSION BETWEEN CASES
If King intended to hold that analysis of human biological samples,
whether the sample is saliva, blood, urine, skin, or hair, is not to be considered
a search under the Fourth Amendment, then the tension between what Justice
Kennedy said in King about chemical analysis of biological samples and what

70. Id. at 76.
71. Id. n.9 (explaining that under its special needs cases, the Court has “routinely treated urine
screens taken by state agents as searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment even though the
results were not reported to the police”).
72. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627.
73. D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
455, 480, 482 (2001) (internal quotation omitted); cf. Kaye & Smith, supra note 9, at 444 (“[T]he sensitive
nature of some of the information locked in the helices of the DNA molecule leads us to believe that DNA
sampling is a Fourth Amendment search, even if the sample is obtained noninvasively.”).
74. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
75. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618.
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he said in Skinner is obvious.76 Of course, one could argue that King’s
determination that analysis of an arrestee’s DNA sample was not a search
turned on the fact that the analysis only disclosed “noncoding parts of the
DNA that do not reveal the genetic traits of the arrestee.”77 Moreover, even
if the noncoding regions of the DNA, otherwise known as junk DNA, could
reveal some genetic information, “[i]t is undisputed that law enforcement
officers analyze DNA for the sole purpose of generating a unique identifying
number against which future samples may be matched.”78 In other words,
the analysis of the DNA sample in King only revealed an arrestee’s
identification or unique DNA profile.79 It was no different than police
analysis of a fingerprint,80 a voice or handwriting exemplar,81 or a photograph
of someone’s face,82 all information not protected by the Fourth Amendment.
The problem with this position is that a similar argument could have
been utilized in Skinner to find that analysis of blood, urine, and breath did
not constitute a search. The analysis of blood and urine samples in Skinner
was done “to detect and measure alcohol and drugs” in the bodies of railroad
workers involved in accidents and safety violations.83 There was no evidence
that analysis was performed to “reveal a host of private medical facts about
an employee, including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or
diabetic.”84 The same was true for the breath tests in Skinner: “breath tests
reveal the level of alcohol in the employee’s bloodstream and nothing
more.”85 Similar to the blood tests upheld in Skinner, “breath tests reveal no
other facts in which the employee has a substantial privacy interest.”86 Thus,
76. See id. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979–80.
77. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979.
78. Id.
79. David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory for Arrestee DNA and Other Biometric Databases,
15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1095, 1142–43 (2013) [hereinafter Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory] (“For
practical purposes, ‘the DNA profile derived from the defendant’s blood sample establishes only a record
of the defendant’s identity’—at least, for now. . . .” (footnote omitted)); D.H. Kaye, Science Fiction and
Shed DNA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 62, 62–63 (2006) [hereinafter Kaye, Science Fiction]
(asserting that “any claim that the DNA profiles currently used for identification constitute ‘predictive
medical information’ is false”).
80. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973). The Court has not definitively ruled on whether
obtaining a person’s fingerprints constitutes a search, although it has strongly hinted that no search occurs
with fingerprinting because it involves “mere ‘physical characteristics . . . constantly exposed to the
public.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973)).
81. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 3 (voice exemplar); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 20 (1973)
(handwriting exemplar).
82. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 14. In United States v. Dionisio, the Court expressed the view that a
person’s facial features were not protected by the Fourth Amendment. See id. (“Like a man’s facial
characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced for others to hear. No person can have a
reasonable expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably
expect that his face will be a mystery to the world.”).
83. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 610 (1989).
84. Id. at 617.
85. Id. at 625.
86. Id. at 626.
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Skinner could have ruled that the analysis of biological samples in that case
did not amount to a search because the tests only revealed whether an
employee had alcohol or drugs in his body, information not protected by the
Constitution in these circumstances.87 The fact that the analysis could have
revealed more private medical information about an employee is of no
constitutional moment because it was undisputed that the tests were
performed only to discover alcohol or drugs. In sum, Skinner could have
relied upon what the particular intrusion actually revealed, rather than what
it might reveal, to find that no search occurred.
Skinner’s conclusion that chemical testing of urine and blood constitutes
a search for Fourth Amendment purposes shows the Court was concerned
with the potential privacy invasion associated with governmental analysis of
biological materials. Skinner’s stance on this point was not an aberration.
Twelve years after Skinner, the Court adopted a similar approach in Kyllo v.
United States.88 In a majority opinion written by Justice Scalia, Kyllo was
concerned with the potential for privacy invasion when it ruled that police
use of a thermal imaging device to measure the heat escaping from a private
home constituted a search.89
Kyllo involved police use of a “relatively crude” thermal imaging
machine that measures the amount of heat emanating from a home.90 The
police suspected that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana in his home,
which typically requires high-intensity lamps.91 The police used the machine
to scan Kyllo’s home, and the results disclosed by the machine, along with
other information, were included in a search warrant application.92 A warrant
was issued, and a subsequent search of the home disclosed “an indoor
growing operation involving more than 100 plants.”93 Kyllo held that police
utilization of a device that is not in general public use to explore details of
the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion constitutes a search.94
Although the police conduct in Kyllo was conducted on a public street,
measured the amount of heat escaping from a home, and revealed no intimate
87. At the time Skinner was decided, a police intrusion, even one directed at a private place, that
only reveals whether contraband and nothing else is present, does not amount to a search under the Fourth
Amendment. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123–24 (1984) (“A chemical test that merely
discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in
privacy.”); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706–07 (1983) (holding that a dog sniff of luggage to
detect whether narcotics are inside the luggage is not a search under the Fourth Amendment); see also
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (relying on Place to hold that a dog sniff of a vehicle during
a lawful traffic stop is not a search under the Fourth Amendment).
88. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
89. Id. at 40.
90. Id. at 36.
91. Id. at 29–30.
92. Id. at 30.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 40.
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details within the home, such as “what hour each night the lady of the house
takes her daily sauna and bath,” those facts were constitutionally irrelevant
in deciding whether a search occurred.95 A contrary rule, Justice Scalia
explained, “would leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing
technology—including imaging technology that could discern all human
activity in the home.”96 Justice Scalia emphasized the importance of
adopting a constitutional rule that takes account of “more sophisticated
systems that are already in use or in development.”97
As in Skinner, when the Court worried about what private medical facts
could be revealed by toxicological analysis of blood and urine, when deciding
whether a search occurred in Kyllo, Justice Scalia was mindful that advancing
technology and science threatened “to shrink the realm of guaranteed
privacy” protected by the Fourth Amendment.98 Put another way, Skinner
and Kyllo were concerned with both the actual and potential disclosure of
information revealed by the challenged government conduct. That is why
Professor Albert Scherr has asserted that the “potential for intrusion on
information created an expectation of privacy in Kyllo and in Skinner.”99
Finally, although California v. Riley addressed the constitutionality of
an undisputed search, the result and reasoning of Riley rested in large part on
the Court’s concern for potential invasions of privacy, rather than the specific
information disclosed by the challenged search.100 Riley and its companion
case, United States v. Wurie, addressed whether police officers without a
warrant may search digital information on a cell phone seized from an
individual incident to arrest. After Riley was arrested for driving with a
suspended license, police conducted two searches of the cell phone found in
his pants.101 The searches disclosed a video of young men fighting while
someone yelled language related to the “Bloods” street gang, and
photographs of Riley standing next to a car that police suspected had been
95. Id. at 38.
96. Id. at 35–36.
97. Id. at 36 (footnote omitted).
98. Id. at 34; see also, Kerr, supra note 12, at 802 (explaining that Kyllo recognized that its “rule
was not needed to resolve the case before it,” and that the Court “justified the broad rule” to “protect the
public from the threat of other more nefarious government surveillance technologies—including
technologies yet to be invented”).
99. Scherr, supra note 10, at 472–73; see also Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 774 (Md. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 1509 (2015) (Adkins, J., dissenting) (explaining that in Kyllo and Skinner “the mere
potential for intrusion on information created an expectation of privacy” (citing Scherr, supra note 10, at
471)). Although it is a minor matter, I disagree with Professor Scherr’s characterization of what was
protected in Skinner and Kyllo. Scherr says, “The potential for intrusion on information created an
expectation of privacy.” Scherr, supra note 10, at 472–73. The potential intrusion did not create the
protected privacy interest. The information disclosed by the intrusion, medical facts in Skinner and
activity inside the home in Kyllo, was the information protected by the Fourth Amendment. See Kyllo,
533 U.S. at 40; Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989). The potential for intrusion
did not create an expectation of privacy; that expectation already existed prior to the intrusion.
100. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
101. Id. at 2480.
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involved in an earlier shooting.102 At trial, “police officers testified about the
photographs and videos found on the phone, and some of the photographs
were admitted into evidence.”103 Riley was convicted on several criminal
charges associated with that shooting. In Wurie, the police opened Wurie’s
flip phone after arresting him for a drug transaction. They also searched the
phone’s call log, which revealed the phone number to Wurie’s apartment.
The fruits of these searches were included in a search warrant application,
which resulted in a search warrant that, when executed, disclosed
incriminating evidence implicating Wurie in narcotics and weapons
offenses.104
Writing for eight Justices, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion held that a
warrantless search of a cell phone incident to arrest violated the Fourth
Amendment. After explaining why the traditional state interests justifying
searches incident to arrest, officer safety and preserving evidence, were
inapposite and could not justify the search, Chief Justice Roberts explained
why “[c]ell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from
other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.”105 He noted that
“the possible intrusion on privacy” is much greater than the intrusion
associated with a physical item found on a person.106 Even the most basic
cell phone “might hold photographs, picture messages, text messages,
Internet browsing history, a calendar, a thousand-entry phone book, and so
on.”107 Further, the Chief Justice noted: “An Internet search and browsing
history, for example, can be found on an Internet-enabled phone and could
reveal an individual’s private interests or concerns—perhaps a search for
certain symptoms of disease, coupled with frequent visits to WebMd.”108
Additionally, the capacity of cell phones permits the storage “in one place
[of] many distinct types of information—an address, a note, a prescription, a
bank statement, a video—that reveal much more in combination than any
isolated record.”109 People who own cell phones, according to Chief Justice
Roberts, “keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their
lives—from the mundane to the intimate.”110
Chief Justice Roberts also remarked that “software on a cell phone, or
‘apps,’ offer a range of tools for managing detailed information about all
aspects of a person’s life.”111 Noting the ubiquity of apps for almost any topic
or activity, the Chief Justice remarked that “[t]he average smart phone user
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 2481.
Id.
Id. at 2481–82.
Id. at 2489.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2490.
Id. at 2489.
Id. at 2490.
Id.
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has installed 33 apps, which together can form a revealing montage of the
user’s life.”112 Further exacerbating the privacy interests related to cell phone
searches, Chief Justice Roberts explained that the data “on many modern cell
phones may not in fact be stored on the device itself.”113 Some modern cell
phones rely on cloud computing “to display data stored on remote servers
rather than on the [phone] itself.”114 In sum, it is fair to say the Riley Court
envisioned the threat posed by warrantless police searches of cell phones as
unique and unabated. That threat required that the police obtain a warrant
before undertaking a cell phone search. “With all they contain and all they
may reveal, they hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”115
Interestingly, the challenged searches in Riley and Wurie did not come
close to the concerns raised by the Chief Justice. None of the searches
involved surveillance of Riley’s or Wurie’s “Internet browsing history,” or
“a revealing montage of [Riley’s or Wurie’s] life.”116 Nevertheless, the
searches were deemed unconstitutional because the Court focused on the
“possible intrusion on privacy” that a cell phone search would entail. 117 Put
simply, Riley “pointed out potential intrusions that could result from a data
search with no indication they were involved in the particular case before the
court.”118
The conflict between King, on the one hand, and Skinner, Kyllo, and
Riley, on the other hand, is obvious. Riley imposed new restraints on police
authority to search for digital information because of the possible intrusion
on privacy.119 In contrast,
The King Court avoided any acknowledgement of the personal nature of
DNA information, limited its consideration of privacy interests to the
specific search involved, overlooked scientific developments in DNA
analysis expanding its investigative use to persons who are neither offenders
nor even arrestees, disregarded potential scientific developments increasing
the information extracted from DNA, and then broadly extended its decision
to DNA laws even more intrusive than the one before the court.120

Indeed, the Court’s differing attitude about Americans’ privacy interests
exhibited in King and Riley is quite startling. When compared to what the
Court approved in King, Chief Justice Roberts’s fear that the police might
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2491.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2494–95 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
116. Id. at 2489–90.
117. Id. at 2489 (emphasis added).
118. People v. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 771 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), superseded by 342 P.3d
415 (Cal. 2015).
119. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (conceding that a “mechanical application of [the Court’s prior
precedent] might well support the warrantless searches” of cell phones).
120. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 771 n.8.
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examine an arrestee’s “frequent visits to WebMd” on his cell phone seems
trivial and exaggerated when one considers the facts in Riley.121 To be sure,
the average American probably would not want the police reading their
Facebook app, but given a choice between the police reading their Facebook
messages or analyzing their DNA sample, my sense is that most Americans
would find that government analysis and storage of their DNA samples
would be a greater threat to privacy.
Concededly, King is not the first case in which the Court purposefully
avoided discussing the threat to privacy posed by technological and scientific
change.122 But the tension between what Justice Kennedy said in King and
what he said in Skinner is apparent.123 Unfortunately, the Court has not
provided a neutral principle for deciding when the potential for intrusion into
personal information matters in Fourth Amendment cases, especially when
new technology is involved.
The potential for invading medical and personal privacy should matter
when considering the constitutionality of analyzing involuntarily shed DNA.
Unlike the process of collecting and testing DNA obtained from those
convicted of crime or persons arrested for serious felonies, currently there are
no statutory safeguards regulating the actions of police and other
governmental officials who obtain, test, and store shed DNA samples.124 If
analysis of the sample is not considered a search, law enforcement officials
can analyze the sample for a host of genetic or personal information without
constitutional restraint.125 “To be sure, no evidence currently exists that such
121. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.
122. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (acknowledging that
“surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally
available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant[;
b]ut the photographs here are not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns”);
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (“[W]e have never held that potential, as opposed to
actual, invasions of privacy constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”); United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983) (dismissing respondent’s claim that permitting the government to
use electronic beeper technology to follow persons across state lines would allow twenty-four hour
surveillance of any citizen in the country without judicial knowledge or supervision: “if such dragnet-type
law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough
then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”); see also United States
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). Jones ruled that a search occurred when the government attached a
global positioning system (GPS) tracking device to a vehicle and used that device to monitor the vehicle’s
movements on the streets for twenty-eight days. The holding in Jones, however, did not turn on the
amount of data disclosed and retained by the government surveillance, but on the trespass associated with
attachment of the GPS device. Thus, Jones did not decide whether obtaining extensive location data is a
search, let alone an unreasonable search.
123. See supra Part II.
124. See Kreag, supra note 24, at 1544–45 (noting that neither the Fourth Amendment nor federal
statutory law regulate law enforcement’s use of local databases).
125. Scherr, supra note 10, at 474 (“The sample could be analyzed for information far beyond that
provided by the more standard 13-loci STR testing, including not only skin pigmentation,
bio-geographical origin, gender, and eye color but also a host of medical diseases, medical and behavioral
predispositions, and perhaps even sexual orientation.”).
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analysis is occurring.”126 Therefore, it appears that law enforcement officials
are limiting their analysis to determine whether samples match DNA
evidence found at crime scenes in cold cases, “but this limitation is generated
by the police themselves.”127
Because there are no checks currently in place to prevent law
enforcement officials from analyzing shed DNA samples for genetic
information, some scholars are alarmed by the potential for the government
to analyze DNA samples for a host of genetic traits.128 For example,
Professor Elizabeth Joh wrote that DNA samples “may one day be used to
identify and segregate those who possess a ‘crime gene.’”129 Joh goes on to
observe that “finding genetic causes for antisocial behavior is the most
widely publicized research of ‘behavioral genetics,’” and the “discovery of a
‘crime gene’ could provide justifications for preventive detentions or other
means of social control for those identified as genetically predisposed to
criminality.”130 While some contend that this fear is overblown and
unjustified, 131 it is not so obvious why concerns about more expansive use
and testing of DNA samples should be easily dismissed.
When the federal CODIS program was initially proposed, privacy
advocates worried that the government’s collection and processing of
126. Id.
127. Joh, supra note 10, at 875. Writing over a decade ago, Professor Joh observed:
Little oversight exists regarding the intentional or accidental inclusion of [abandoned] DNA
evidence into CODIS, regardless of whether a positive match is made between the collected
sample and existing forensic evidence. Nor do state laws appear to address explicitly how
police ought to treat [abandoned] tissue samples and DNA profiles in relation to state
databanks.
Id. at 875–76 (footnotes omitted).
128. See, e.g., id. at 875–77.
129. Id. at 876.
130. Id. at 876–77 (footnote omitted); see also Tania Simoncelli & Barry Steinhardt, California’s
Proposition 69: A Dangerous Precedent for Criminal DNA Databases, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 279, 284
(2005) (“While law enforcement authorities would like us to believe that the samples will never be used
for anything besides catching criminals, an unlimited span of improper uses remain plausible so long as
those samples are retained.”); Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and DNA Familial Searching,
23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 309, 368–70 (2010) (urging caution regarding the government’s possession of
DNA samples, which poses a substantial threat to privacy). In a more recent article, Professor Joh
acknowledges that King “hinted at a willingness to reassess the balance of privacy and government utility”
in the future “should the government one day be interested in gleaning information from DNA samples
other than matching profiles to crime scene samples.” Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data
and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 65 (2014).
131. Kaye, Science Fiction, supra note 79 (dismissing Joh’s concerns as “science-fiction”); see also
Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 79, at 1143–53 (noting that “the limited information that
CODIS loci now supply does not begin to approach” the concerns mentioned in Skinner about the
disclosure of private medical facts); id. at 1158 (concluding that if police have slight “motivation to
[scrutinize] an arrestee’s health-related and ancestry-informative loci,” if the means to conduct such a
search are not readily available, and if the mechanisms for detecting and punishing this type of illegal
search “are effective, then the retention of samples should not defeat [a] biometric exception for DNA
databanks”); Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76
WASH. L. REV. 413, 440 (2001) (stating that police have “little incentive to probe areas of the genome that
would determine characteristics not discernible to individuals acquainted with a suspect”).
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biological materials would not be confined to persons convicted of violent
crimes.132 We now know those fears were warranted. “CODIS expanded
from an initial focus on collecting profiles from offenders convicted of
certain violent crimes, to all felony offenders, and now to arrestees.”133 And
after originally barring familial searches of DNA samples, “CODIS now
permits them in certain circumstances.”134 Indeed, in King the Justices were
informed of, but expressed no concern about, the way federal and state DNA
databases have expanded their reach over the years.135 Today, the United
States has the world’s largest DNA database.136 As science and technology
advance, it is naïve to think that scientists and government officials will
ignore the opportunity to learn about the genetic traits of persons, especially
persons convicted or charged with violent crimes.137
132. See Kreag, supra note 24, at 1533 (stating that privacy advocates feared that once the federal
government’s “DNA database was created, it would be too tempting for law enforcement to be able to
limit its use, causing the tool to evolve and reach deeper into our lives”).
133. Id. (citing Joh, supra note 130, at 51).
134. Id. As Professor Erin Murphy explains in her outstanding article on familial searching, in the
typical DNA database search, police seek the source of biological material left at a crime scene by
searching database profiles that exactly match the DNA profile obtained from the crime scene sample.
Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV. 291, 292 (2010).
By contrast, familial searching looks for partial matches of the crime scene DNA profile to find potential
relatives of the source who left the crime scene sample. Id. at 297–98. As Murphy describes: “Familial
searching refers generally to the idea of looking in a DNA database not for the person who left the crime
scene sample, but rather for a relative of that individual.” Id. at 297; see also Natalie Ram, DNA by the
Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 876–77 (2015) (explaining that under familial searching, “individuals
who have never been arrested—and whose DNA could not lawfully be placed in a forensic DNA database
directly—may nonetheless be identified, surveilled, and arrested based on a partial DNA match to a close
relative”).
135. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Should Arrestee DNA Databases Extend to Misdemeanors?, in 8 RECENT
ADVANCES IN DNA AND GENE SEQUENCES, no. 2, 2014, at 59, 61 (explaining that though King’s holding
would seem to be confined to compulsory DNA collection to those arrested for “serious” felonies, the
Court knew of the federal law permitting collection from all arrestees, suggesting that “an offense severity
limitation is not essential to King’s core rationale”).
136. Solomon Moore, F.B.I. and States Vastly Expand DNA Databases, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/19/us/19DNA.html?_r=0; see also Joh, supra note 130, at 50 (“The
United States has used [DNA samples collected from offenders and arrestees] to amass the largest DNA
database in the world.”).
137. See, e.g., David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Statutory Frameworks for Regulating
Information Flows: Drawing Lessons for the DNA Data Banks from Other Government Data Systems, 34
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 366, 372 (2006) (remarking that the government’s retention of DNA samples “invites
re-purposing at a later stage” (emphasis added)); Joh, supra note 10, at 877 (“[M]ore expansive DNA
analysis would justifiably serve crime control purposes if science identifies markers for criminogenic
behaviors, such as high levels of aggression, or for mental illness. For any of these diagnoses, only a
single DNA sample would be required.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Kelly Lowenberg, Applying the
Fourth Amendment When DNA Collected for One Purpose Is Tested for Another, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1289,
1304 (2011) (explaining that Alabama and Michigan permit stored DNA samples to be “accessed and
tested for medical research”). As interpreted today, Fourth Amendment principles do not restrain the
government from conducting such additional searches. See Joh, supra note 130, at 63 (“The Fourth
Amendment is primarily interested in the legitimacy of how information is acquired. If the acquisition is
permissible, how the police use that information thereafter is generally not subject to an additional Fourth
Amendment challenge.” (footnote omitted)); Erin Murphy, Back to the Future: The Curious Case of
United States v. Jones, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325, 330–31 (2012) (“Current Fourth Amendment law
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Finally, and most importantly, government officials retain the biological
materials that produce the DNA profiles.138 This is the most dangerous threat
posed by DNA databases to privacy interests under the Fourth
Amendment.139 Even Professor David Kaye, a proponent of universal DNA
testing, concedes: “There is no doubt that the physical samples (as
distinguished from the records in the databases) contain a ‘host of private
medical facts.’”140 Justice Kennedy’s opinion in King paid scant attention to
this concern. Although King stressed that Maryland’s DNA law only
permitted collection and testing for identification purposes, the Court did not
condition its approval of the statute on this statutory safeguard.141 Thus,
testing of stored DNA samples for additional genetic information can be
authorized by a legislature at any time.142
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF LEAVING THE ANALYSIS OF ABANDONED DNA
UNREGULATED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Over forty years ago, Anthony Amsterdam characterized the task
confronting the Court when asked to determine whether a challenged
governmental intrusion triggers Fourth Amendment protection.143 According
to Professor Amsterdam, deciding whether police action constitutes a search
ultimately requires a “value judgment.”144 He explained: “It is whether, if
the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go
emphasizes acquisition: how did the police acquire the DNA sample or financial record or biometric
image? It cares little for what happens next—to what use that information is put.”).
138. See, e.g., State v. Medina, 102 A.3d 661, 664 (Vt. 2014) (noting that Vermont statutes allow for
the creation of a DNA database for storing DNA samples).
139. See, e.g., id. at 682 (“It is also important to note that the DNA samples being seized provide a
massive amount of unique, private information about a person that goes beyond identification of that
person.”); SHELDON KRIMSKY & TANIA SIMONCELLI, GENETIC JUSTICE: DNA DATA BANKS, CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 235–36 (2011) (“DNA samples, which are stored indefinitely by
forensic laboratories . . . have the potential to reveal almost unlimited information about [individuals].).
140. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory, supra note 79, at 1155; D.H. Kaye, Please, Let’s Bury the
Junk: The CODIS Loci and the Revelation of Private Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70, 81
(2007), http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=nulr
_online (acknowledging the “scientifically tenable claim that the DNA molecules in a sample are a threat
to privacy; [i]t is time to move on from the debate over ‘junk DNA’ and to address realistically the true
privacy problems posed by the growing repositories of DNA samples”); Kaye, Science Fiction, supra note
79, at 65 (“DNA sampling is potentially more threatening than lifting fingerprints. Both traces carry
genetic information, but DNA samples usually contain far more of it.”). Professor Kaye contends that
“comprehensive and indefinite sample retention is not essential to DNA databases.” Kaye, A Fourth
Amendment Theory, supra note 79, at 1158.
141. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (“The Court need not speculate about the risks
posed ‘by a system that did not contain comparable security provisions.’”).
142. Cf. Medina, 102 A.3d at 682 (“While current law limits use of the sample, that law can be
amended to allow greater use; the retention of the DNA sample suggests that expanded use is possible in
the future.”).
143. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
403 (1974).
144. Id.
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unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom
remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the
aims of a free and open society.”145
The immediate impact of a ruling that analyzing abandoned DNA does
not constitute a search would leave law enforcement officials free to collect,
analyze, and store anyone’s DNA sample, provided there was no government
coercion or trespass involved with obtaining the sample. This would leave
police and state officials free to engage in covert efforts to obtain DNA
samples. Thus, a city, county, or state could initiate procedures to secretly
obtain DNA samples from persons applying for or renewing a driver’s
license, from persons registering to vote or actually voting at a polling station,
or even from rummaging through peoples’ garbage left out for collection.
These efforts to surreptitiously obtain abandoned DNA, and many others,
would not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals who have
neither committed an offense nor given law enforcement officials reason to
suspect that they had committed an offense.
I think many Americans would find such scenarios to be invasions
of their privacy, and for good reason. The central purpose of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect us from arbitrary searches and seizures by
governmental actors. Put another way, unchecked or discretionary police
authority is the chief evil the Fourth Amendment was meant to combat.
Proponents of universal DNA collection and analysis, however, will say that
this scenario is no cause for alarm because the government will only
use abandoned DNA for identification purposes. Furthermore, a majority of
the Court views DNA identification as “superior” to fingerprinting.146
145. Id. As a practical matter, the “value judgment” described by Professor Amsterdam comes down
to whether five or more Justices are comfortable with having the challenged police conduct applied to
themselves. During oral arguments for United States v. Jones, which considered whether covertly placing
a GPS device on a vehicle constituted a search, Chief Justice Roberts posed the following question to
Deputy Solicitor General Michael Drebeen: “You think there would also not be a search if you put a GPS
device on all of our cars, monitored our movements for a month? You think you’re entitled to do that
under your theory?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No.
10-1259), 2011 WL 5360051. Ultimately, Drebeen conceded that under the Government’s argument,
federal agents could place GPS devices on the vehicles of all the Justices. Id. at 9–10; see also Minnesota
v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that “the only thing the past three decades
have established about the Katz test (which has come to mean the test enunciated by Justice Harlan’s
separate concurrence in Katz) is that, unsurprisingly, those ‘actual (subjective) expectation[s] of privacy’
‘that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable”’ bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations
of privacy that this Court considers reasonable” (citations omitted)).
146. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1976. There is an energetic debate among legal scholars and scientists
regarding how much genetic information can be derived from noncoding parts of DNA, so-called junk
DNA. Regarding this debate, King asserted: “The argument that the testing at issue in this case reveals
any private medical information at all is open to dispute.” Id. at 1979. This claim was made without
citation or explanation. Other courts have been more cautious regarding the claim that junk DNA does
not provide medical information. See, e.g., People v. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 772 n.9 (Cal. Ct. App.
2014), superseded by 342 P.3d 415 (Cal. 2015) (“Questions about how much information may be derived
from junk DNA now and in the future have been the subject of much debate in scientific and legal
communities, and studies have begun to suggest links between the CODIS loci and susceptibility to certain
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I do not know how most Americans would react if it came to light that
federal or state officials were engaged in surreptitious efforts to obtain
everyone’s fingerprints, even if such actions were only designed for
identification purposes. We do know, however, the reaction of Americans
when it was revealed that the federal government was secretly tracking and
storing the phone numbers dialed and received by everyone.147 Most had a
negative reaction and believed that the government invaded everyone’s
privacy.148
Although the comparison is not perfect, there are similarities between
the collection and analysis of involuntarily shed DNA and the federal
government’s telephone surveillance program. To understand some of the
similarities, we need to go back to Smith v. Maryland, in which the Court
concluded that police installation of a pen register, which records the
telephone numbers dialed from a person’s home or office, at a telephone
company did not constitute a search.149 Writing for the majority, Justice
Blackmun ruled that a telephone user has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the telephone numbers dialed because they are voluntarily revealed
to the phone company and because it is common for phone companies to keep
this information in their business records.150 According to Justice Blackmun,
“it is too much to believe that telephone subscribers, under these
circumstances, harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will
remain secret.”151

diseases, as well as family relationships and ancestry.”). Sheldon Krimsky and Tania Simoncelli discuss
the possibility that junk loci may be found to correlate with sensitive information even if the junk codi
themselves do not contain sensitive coding information. KRIMSKY & SIMONCELLI, supra note 139, at 236.
For a sampling of the debate, compare Simon A. Cole, Is the “Junk” DNA Designation Bunk?, 102 NW.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 54 (2007), http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1082&context=nulr_online; with Kaye, supra note 140 and David Kaye, What the Supreme Court
Hasn’t Told You About DNA Databases, PROMEGA (2013), http://www.promega.com/resources/
profiles-in-dna/2013/what-the-supreme-court-hasnt-told-you-about-dna-databases/. There is no dispute,
however, that the DNA samples themselves contain an enormous amount of highly personal information
and represent a real threat to privacy once government officials possess the samples. See KRIMSKY &
SIMONCELLI, supra note 139 (“DNA samples, which are stored indefinitely by forensic
laboratories . . . have the potential to reveal almost unlimited information about [individuals].”).
147. See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily,
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 6:05 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-recordsverizon-court-order; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: BULK
COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 1 (2013),
https://info.publicintelligence.net/DoJ-NSABulkCollection.pdf (summarizing the “Government’s legal
basis for an intelligence collection program” that collected and stored the metadata of Americans’
telephone calls).
148. Global Opinions of U.S. Surveillance, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/
nsa-opinion/table/american-citizens/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2015) (stating that 61% of Americans found it
unacceptable for the American government to monitor communications from American citizens).
149. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).
150. See id. at 742–43.
151. Id. at 743.
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Smith followed a long line of precedent in which the Court found that
individuals have no privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment
when they reveal information to a third party.152 Under this legal theory,
individuals assume the risk that, by revealing private information to a third
party, the government will gain access to that information—even if
individuals assume that the information will not be disclosed and that third
parties will not betray their confidence.153
On June 6, 2013, Americans learned that the federal government had
been operating a secret program that tracked and analyzed telephone numbers
dialed and received by almost every person within the United States and
between the United States and foreign countries.154 Under the program, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders telephone communications
companies to provide telephone “metadata” in bulk to the National Security
Agency (NSA).155 According to the government, telephone metadata
“includes information about what telephone numbers were used to make and
receive the calls, when the calls took place, and how long the calls lasted.”156
The content of calls is not revealed to the government.157
The federal government’s telephone surveillance program is just an
exponentially expanded version of what Smith v. Maryland already permits.
After all, “what metadata is has not changed over time.”158 The information
revealed by the pen register in Smith v. Maryland is the same information
obtained by the NSA telephone metadata surveillance program. To be sure,
as Judge Leon emphasized in an opinion finding the program
unconstitutional, “the ubiquity of phones has dramatically altered the
quantity of information that is now available and, more importantly, what
that information can tell the Government about people’s lives.”159 But that
characterization does not alter the fact that when extant Fourth Amendment
norms are applied to the NSA program, Americans knowingly reveal the
numbers they dial to telecommunication companies.
The point here is not the correctness of Smith v. Maryland; rather, my
point is to consider the similarities between collecting and analyzing shed
DNA and the NSA telephone surveillance program. Both intrusions rely on
individuals exposing material to third parties or in the public domain in the
absence of government coercion or force; both involve collecting and storing
vast amounts of personal information; both intrusions are executed by law
enforcement officials without the requisite amount of suspicion traditionally
152. Id. at 743–44.
153. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
154. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 147.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 35 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded per curiam,
800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
159. Id. at 35–36.
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required by Fourth Amendment norms; and finally, both intrusions yield
potential evidentiary fruits that facilitate law enforcement interests.
The Obama Administration has argued that the NSA program does not
involve searches under the Fourth Amendment in light of Smith v.
Maryland.160 Moreover, even if the collection of telephone metadata
amounts to searches, the Administration maintains that under the balancing
formula adopted in King, the program is constitutional.161
The
Administration contends that the program involves a minimal intrusion on
the privacy of telephone users and does not collect the content of calls, and
that the data captured by the program may be accessed only when the
government has a reasonable suspicion that a particular phone number is
associated with a specific foreign terrorist group.162 Because, according to
the Obama Administration, “only an exceedingly small fraction of the data
collected has ever been seen,” the program is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.163 Put differently, the Administration views the NSA telephone
metadata program as a monitoring device that merely collects information
related to telephone identification data that has already been revealed to third
parties.164 Of course, government collection and analysis of shed DNA
samples can be characterized the same way—the government is merely
collecting, testing, and storing DNA identification information.
Even when viewed through the legal lens of the Court’s
assumption-of-risk doctrine, I doubt most Americans would approve of the
government collecting, analyzing, and storing shed DNA samples. I believe
that many Americans would find such a program, like the NSA telephone
surveillance program, a threat to their personal privacy, and would derive no
comfort from the claim that the government seeks DNA samples only for
identification purposes.
To paraphrase Professor Amsterdam, most
Americans would find this type of monitoring, unregulated by constitutional
restraints, a threat to the privacy of citizens in a manner “inconsistent with
the aims of a free and open society.”165
V. CONCLUSION
I have previously noted that the result and logic of King seem “to be
miles away from” the massive data mining associated with the NSA
telephone metadata program.166 Yet, lawyers for the Obama Administration

160. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 147, at 19–20.
161. Id. at 21.
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013) for the rule that intrusions on privacy
interests are limited when DNA analysis is used to provide only identification information).
164. See id. at 20.
165. Amsterdam, supra note 143, at 405.
166. Maclin, supra note 61, at 402 n.225.
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view King as persuasive legal authority for the program.167 The constitutionality of the NSA telephone metadata program or some similar future
surveillance program will be decided by the judiciary. Time will tell whether
the constitutional arguments of the Obama Administration will prevail.168
Whatever the outcome in those cases, for the reasons described above, I do
not believe that King supports collection and analysis of shed DNA samples
by police officials. Government analysis of shed DNA is a search under the
Fourth Amendment. Thus, allowing government officials unfettered
discretion to collect, analyze, and store DNA samples is inconsistent with the
central meaning of the Fourth Amendment, which is designed to check the
discretionary power of the police.

167. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 147, at 21.
168. See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 42–43 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding the program
unconstitutional as applied to particular plaintiffs), vacated and remanded per curiam, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C.
Cir. 2015); see also ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (upholding
constitutionality of the program), vacated and remanded, 785 F.3d 787, 821 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[W]e hold
that the text of § 215 [the federal statutory provision that purportedly authorized the NSA program] cannot
bear the weight the government asks us to assign to it, and that it does not authorize the telephone metadata
program.”); id. at 824 (“Because we conclude that the challenged program was not authorized by the
statute on which the government bases its claim of legal authority, we need not and do not reach these
weighty constitutional issues. The seriousness of the constitutional concerns, however, has some bearing
on what we hold today, and on the consequences of that holding.”).

